

Combining Logics in Simple Type Theory^{*}

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Abstract. Simple type theory is suited as framework for combining classical and non-classical logics. This claim is based on the observation that various prominent logics, including (quantified) multimodal logics and intuitionistic logics, can be elegantly embedded in simple type theory. Furthermore, simple type theory is sufficiently expressive to model combinations of embedded logics and it has a well understood semantics. Off-the-shelf reasoning systems for simple type theory exist that can be uniformly employed for reasoning *within* and *about* combinations of logics. Combinations of modal logics and other logics are particularly relevant for multi-agent systems.

1 Introduction

Church’s simple type theory *STT* [18], also known as classical higher-order logic, is suited as a framework for combining classical and non-classical logics. This is what this paper illustrates.

Evidently, *STT* has many prominent classical logic fragments, including propositional and first-order logic, the guarded fragment, second-order logic, monadic second-order logic, the basic fragment of *STT*, etc. Interestingly, also prominent non-classical logics – including quantified multi-modal logics and intuitionistic logic – can be elegantly embedded in *STT*. It is thus not surprising that also combinations of such logics can be flexibly modeled within *STT*. Our claim is furthermore supported by the fact that the semantics of *STT* is well understood [1, 2, 8, 26] and that powerful proof assistants and automated theorem provers for *STT* already exist. The automation of *STT* currently experiences a renaissance that has been fostered by the recent extension of the successful TPTP infrastructure for first-order logic [33] to higher-order logic, called TPTP THF [34, 35, 15]. Exploiting this new infrastructure we will demonstrate how higher-order automated theorem provers and model generators can be employed for reasoning *within* and *about* combinations of logics.

Our work is relevant for multi-agents systems in several ways. Most importantly, modal logics and combinations of modal logics are often employed for modeling multi-agents systems and for reasoning about them.

^{*} A previous version of this paper has been presented at the World Congress and School on Universal Logic III (UNILOG’2010), Lisbon, Portugal, April 18-25, 2010.

^{**} This work has been funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG) under grant BE 2501/6-1.

In this paper we present a fresh approach to the automation of logic combinations and we in particular include quantified modal logics. For quantified modal logics actually only very few theorem provers are available. In our approach even challenge combinations of logics can be achieved: as an example we outline a combination of spatial and epistemic reasoning. Moreover, our approach even supports the automated analysis and verification of meta-properties of combined logics. It can thus serve as a useful tool for engineers of logic combinations.

In Sect. 2 we outline our embedding of quantified multimodal logics in STT . Further logic embeddings in STT are discussed in Sect. 3; our examples comprise intuitionistic logic, access control logics and the region connection calculus. In Sect. 4 we illustrate how the reasoning *about* logics and their combinations is facilitated in our approach, and in Sect. 5 we employ simple examples to demonstrate the application of our approach for reasoning *within* combined logics. The performance results of our experiments with off-the-shelf, TPTP THF compliant higher-order automated reasoning systems are presented in Sect. 6.

2 (Normal) Quantified Multimodal Logics in STT

STT [18] is based on the simply typed λ -calculus. The set \mathcal{T} of simple types is usually freely generated from a set of basic types $\{o, \iota\}$ (where o is the type of Booleans and ι is the type of individuals) using the right-associative function type constructor \rightarrow . Instead of $\{o, \iota\}$ we here consider a set of base types $\{o, \iota, \mu\}$, providing an additional base type μ (the type of possible worlds).

The simple type theory language STT is defined by (where $\alpha, \beta, o \in \mathcal{T}$):

$$s, t ::= p_\alpha \mid X_\alpha \mid (\lambda X_{\alpha^*} s_\beta)_{\alpha \rightarrow \beta} \mid (s_{\alpha \rightarrow \beta} t_\alpha)_\beta \mid (\neg_{o \rightarrow o} s_o)_o \mid \\ (s_o \vee_{o \rightarrow o \rightarrow o} t_o)_o \mid (s_\alpha =_{\alpha \rightarrow \alpha \rightarrow o} t_\alpha)_o \mid (\Pi_{(\alpha \rightarrow o) \rightarrow o} s_{\alpha \rightarrow o})_o$$

p_α denotes typed constants and X_α typed variables (distinct from p_α). Complex typed terms are constructed via abstraction and application. Our logical connectives of choice are $\neg_{o \rightarrow o}$, $\vee_{o \rightarrow o \rightarrow o}$, $=_{\alpha \rightarrow \alpha \rightarrow o}$ and $\Pi_{(\alpha \rightarrow o) \rightarrow o}$ (for each type α).¹ From these connectives, other logical connectives can be defined in the usual way (e.g., \wedge and \Rightarrow). We often use binder notation $\forall X_{\alpha^*} s$ for $\Pi_{(\alpha \rightarrow o) \rightarrow o} (\lambda X_{\alpha^*} s_o)$. We assume familiarity with α -conversion, β - and η -reduction, and the existence of β - and $\beta\eta$ -normal forms. Moreover, we obey the usual definitions of free variable occurrences and substitutions.

The semantics of STT is well understood and thoroughly documented in the literature [1, 2, 8, 26]. The semantics of choice for our work is Henkin semantics.

Quantified modal logics have been studied by Fitting [19] (further related work is available by Blackburn and Marx [16] and Braüner [17]). In contrast to Fitting we are here not interested only in **S5** structures but in the more general case of **K** from which more constrained structures (such as **S5**) can be easily obtained. First-order quantification can be constant domain or varying domain.

¹ This choice is not minimal (from $=_{\alpha \rightarrow \alpha \rightarrow o}$ all other logical constants can already be defined [3]). It is useful though in the context of resolution based theorem proving.

Below we only consider the constant domain case: every possible world has the same domain. Like Fitting, we keep our definitions simple by not having function or constant symbols. While Fitting [19] studies quantified monomodal logic, we are interested in quantified multimodal logic. Hence, we introduce multiple \Box_r operators for symbols r from an index set S . The grammar for our quantified multimodal logic \mathcal{QML} hence is

$$s, t ::= P \mid k(X^1, \dots, X^n) \mid \neg s \mid s \vee t \mid \forall X_{\bullet}.s \mid \forall P_{\bullet}.s \mid \Box_r s$$

where $P \in \mathcal{PV}$ denotes propositional variables, $X, X^i \in \mathcal{TV}$ denote first-order (individual) variables, and $k \in \mathcal{SYM}$ denotes predicate symbols of any arity. Further connectives, quantifiers, and modal operators can be defined as usual. We also obey the usual definitions of free variable occurrences and substitutions.

Fitting introduces three different notions of Kripke semantics for \mathcal{QML} : $\mathbf{QS5}\pi^-$, $\mathbf{QS5}\pi$, and $\mathbf{QS5}\pi^+$. In our work [10] we study related notions $\mathbf{QK}\pi^-$, $\mathbf{QK}\pi$, and $\mathbf{QK}\pi^+$ for a modal context \mathbf{K} , and we support multiple modalities.

STT is an expressive logic and it is thus not surprising that \mathcal{QML} can be elegantly modeled and even automated as a fragment of STT . The idea of the encoding, called \mathcal{QML}^{STT} , is simple. Choose type ι to denote the (non-empty) set of individuals and we choose the second base type μ to denote the (non-empty) set of possible worlds. As usual, the type o denotes the set of truth values. Certain formulas of type $\mu \rightarrow o$ then correspond to multimodal logic expressions. The multimodal connectives \neg , \vee , and \Box , become λ -terms of types $(\mu \rightarrow o) \rightarrow (\mu \rightarrow o)$, $(\mu \rightarrow o) \rightarrow (\mu \rightarrow o) \rightarrow (\mu \rightarrow o)$, and $(\mu \rightarrow \mu \rightarrow o) \rightarrow (\mu \rightarrow o) \rightarrow (\mu \rightarrow o)$ respectively.

Quantification is handled as in STT by modeling $\forall X_{\bullet}.p$ as $\Pi(\lambda X_{\bullet}.p)$ for a suitably chosen connective Π . Here we are interested in defining two particular modal Π -connectives: Π^{ι} , for quantification over individual variables, and $\Pi^{\mu \rightarrow o}$, for quantification over modal propositional variables that depend on worlds. They become terms of type $(\iota \rightarrow (\mu \rightarrow o)) \rightarrow (\mu \rightarrow o)$ and $((\mu \rightarrow o) \rightarrow (\mu \rightarrow o)) \rightarrow (\mu \rightarrow o)$ respectively.

The \mathcal{QML}^{STT} modal operators \neg , \vee , \Box , Π^{ι} , and $\Pi^{\mu \rightarrow o}$ are now simply defined as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \neg_{(\mu \rightarrow o) \rightarrow (\mu \rightarrow o)} &= \lambda \phi_{\mu \rightarrow o} \lambda W_{\mu} \neg \phi W \\ \vee_{(\mu \rightarrow o) \rightarrow (\mu \rightarrow o) \rightarrow (\mu \rightarrow o)} &= \lambda \phi_{\mu \rightarrow o} \lambda \psi_{\mu \rightarrow o} \lambda W_{\mu} \phi W \vee \psi W \\ \Box_{(\mu \rightarrow \mu \rightarrow o) \rightarrow (\mu \rightarrow o) \rightarrow (\mu \rightarrow o)} &= \lambda R_{\mu \rightarrow \mu \rightarrow o} \lambda \phi_{\mu \rightarrow o} \lambda W_{\mu} \forall V_{\mu} \neg R W V \vee \phi V \\ \Pi^{\iota}_{(\iota \rightarrow (\mu \rightarrow o)) \rightarrow (\mu \rightarrow o)} &= \lambda \phi_{\iota \rightarrow (\mu \rightarrow o)} \lambda W_{\mu} \forall X_{\iota} \phi X W \\ \Pi^{\mu \rightarrow o}_{((\mu \rightarrow o) \rightarrow (\mu \rightarrow o)) \rightarrow (\mu \rightarrow o)} &= \lambda \phi_{(\mu \rightarrow o) \rightarrow (\mu \rightarrow o)} \lambda W_{\mu} \forall P_{\mu \rightarrow o} \phi P W \end{aligned}$$

Note that our encoding actually only employs the second-order fragment of STT enhanced with lambda-abstraction.

Further operators can be introduced as usual, for example, $\top = \lambda W_{\mu} \top$, $\perp = \neg \top$, $\wedge = \lambda \phi, \psi_{\bullet} \neg (\neg \phi \vee \neg \psi)$, $\supset = \lambda \phi, \psi_{\bullet} \neg \phi \vee \psi$, $\Leftrightarrow = \lambda \phi, \psi_{\bullet} (\phi \supset \psi) \wedge (\psi \supset \phi)$, $\diamond = \lambda R, \phi_{\bullet} \neg (\Box R (\neg \phi))$, $\Sigma^{\iota} = \lambda \phi_{\bullet} \neg \Pi^{\iota} (\lambda X_{\bullet} \neg \phi X)$, $\Sigma^{\mu \rightarrow o} = \lambda \phi_{\bullet} \neg \Pi^{\mu \rightarrow o} (\lambda P_{\bullet} \neg \phi P)$.

For defining \mathcal{QML}^{STT} -propositions we fix a set \mathcal{IV}^{STT} of individual variables of type ι , a set \mathcal{PV}^{STT} of propositional variables² of type $\mu \rightarrow o$, and a set \mathcal{SYM}^{STT} of n -ary (curried) predicate symbols of types $\underbrace{\iota \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow \iota}_n \rightarrow (\mu \rightarrow o)$.

Moreover, we fix a set \mathcal{S}^{STT} of accessibility relation constants of type $\mu \rightarrow \mu \rightarrow o$. \mathcal{QML}^{STT} -propositions are now defined as the smallest set of STT -terms for which the following hold:

- if $P \in \mathcal{PV}^{STT}$, then $P \in \mathcal{QML}^{STT}$
- if $X^j \in \mathcal{IV}^{STT}$ ($j = 1, \dots, n$) and $k \in \mathcal{SYM}^{STT}$, then $(k X^1 \dots X^n) \in \mathcal{QML}^{STT}$
- if $\phi, \psi \in \mathcal{QML}^{STT}$, then $\neg \phi \in \mathcal{QML}^{STT}$ and $\phi \vee \psi \in \mathcal{QML}^{STT}$
- if $r \in \mathcal{S}^{STT}$ and $\phi \in \mathcal{QML}^{STT}$, then $\Box_r \phi \in \mathcal{QML}^{STT}$
- if $X \in \mathcal{IV}^{STT}$ and $\phi \in \mathcal{QML}^{STT}$, then $\Pi^\iota(\lambda X. \phi) \in \mathcal{QML}^{STT}$
- if $P \in \mathcal{PV}^{STT}$ and $\phi \in \mathcal{QML}^{STT}$, then $\Pi^{\mu \rightarrow o}(\lambda P. \phi) \in \mathcal{QML}^{STT}$

We write $\Box_r \phi$ for $\Box_r \phi$, $\forall X_{\iota^\bullet} \phi$ for $\Pi^\iota(\lambda X_{\iota^\bullet} \phi)$, and $\forall P_{\mu \rightarrow o^\bullet} \phi$ for $\Pi^{\mu \rightarrow o}(\lambda P_{\mu \rightarrow o^\bullet} \phi)$.

Note that the defining equations for our \mathcal{QML} modal operators are themselves formulas in STT . Hence, we can express \mathcal{QML} formulas in a higher-order reasoner elegantly in the usual syntax. For example, $\Box_r \exists P_{\mu \rightarrow o^\bullet} P$ is a \mathcal{QML}^{STT} proposition; it has type $\mu \rightarrow o$.

Validity of \mathcal{QML}^{STT} propositions is defined in the obvious way: a \mathcal{QML} -proposition $\phi_{\mu \rightarrow o}$ is valid if and only if for all possible worlds w_μ we have $w \in \phi_{\mu \rightarrow o}$, that is, if and only if $\phi_{\mu \rightarrow o} w_\mu$ holds. Hence, the notion of validity is modeled via the following equation (alternatively we could define valid simply as $\Pi_{(\mu \rightarrow o) \rightarrow o}$):

$$\text{valid} = \lambda \phi_{\mu \rightarrow o^\bullet} \forall W_{\mu^\bullet} \phi W$$

Now we can formulate proof problems in \mathcal{QML}^{STT} , e.g., valid $\Box_r \exists P_{\mu \rightarrow o^\bullet} P$. Using rewriting or definition expanding, we can reduce such proof problems to corresponding statements containing only the basic connectives $\neg, \vee, =, \Pi^\iota$, and $\Pi^{\mu \rightarrow o}$ of STT . In contrast to the many other approaches no external transformation mechanism is required. For our example formula valid $\Box_r \exists P_{\mu \rightarrow o^\bullet} P$ unfolding and $\beta\eta$ -reduction leads to $\forall W_{\mu^\bullet} \forall Y_{\mu^\bullet} \neg r W Y \vee (\neg \forall X_{\mu \rightarrow o^\bullet} \neg (X Y))$. It is easy to check that this formula is valid in Henkin semantics: put $X = \lambda Y_{\mu^\bullet} \top$.

We have proved soundness and completeness for this embedding [10], that is, for $s \in \mathcal{QML}$ and the corresponding $s_{\mu \rightarrow o} \in \mathcal{QML}^{STT} \subset STT$ we have:

Theorem 1. $\models^{STT} (\text{valid } s_{\mu \rightarrow o})$ if and only if $\models^{\mathbf{QK}\pi} s$.

This result also illustrates the correspondence between $\mathbf{QK}\pi$ models and Henkin models; for more details see [10].

Obviously, the reduction of our embedding to first-order multimodal logics (which only allow quantification over individual variables), to propositional quantified multimodal logics (which only allow quantification over propositional variables) and to propositional multimodal logics (no quantifiers) is sound and

² Note that the denotation of propositional variables depends on worlds.

complete. Extending our embedding for hybrid logics is straightforward [27]; note in particular that denomination of individual worlds using constant symbols of type μ is easily possible.

In the remainder we will often omit type information. It is sufficient to remember that worlds are of type μ , multimodal propositions of type $\mu \rightarrow o$, and accessibility relations of type $\mu \rightarrow \mu \rightarrow o$. Individuals are of type ι .

3 Embeddings of Other Logics in \mathcal{STT}

We have studied several other logic embeddings in \mathcal{STT} , some of which will be mentioned in this section.

Intuitionistic Logics Gödel's interpretation of propositional intuitionistic logic in propositional modal logic $S4$ [23] can be combined with our results from the previous section in order to provide a sound and complete embedding of propositional intuitionistic logic into \mathcal{STT} [10].

Gödel studies the propositional intuitionistic logic \mathcal{IPL} defined by

$$s, t ::= p \mid \dot{\rightarrow} s \mid s \dot{\supset} t \mid s \dot{\vee} t \mid p \dot{\wedge} t$$

He introduces the a mapping from \mathcal{IPL} into propositional modal logic $S4$ which maps $\dot{\rightarrow} s$ to $\neg \Box_r s$, $s \dot{\supset} t$ to $\Box_r s \supset \Box_r t$, $s \dot{\vee} t$ to $\Box_r s \vee \Box_r t$, and $s \dot{\wedge} t$ to $s \wedge t$.³ By simply combining Gödel's mapping with our mapping from before we obtain the following embedding of \mathcal{IPL} in \mathcal{STT} .

Let \mathcal{IPL} be a propositional intuitionistic logic with atomic primitives p^1, \dots, p^m ($m \geq 1$). We define the set $\mathcal{IPL}^{\mathcal{STT}}$ of corresponding propositional intuitionistic logic propositions in \mathcal{STT} as follows.

1. For the atomic \mathcal{IPL} primitives p^1, \dots, p^m we introduce corresponding $\mathcal{IPL}^{\mathcal{STT}}$ predicate constants $p_{\mu \rightarrow o}^1, \dots, p_{\mu \rightarrow o}^m$. Moreover, we provide the single accessibility relation constant $r_{\mu \rightarrow \mu \rightarrow o}$.
2. Corresponding to Gödel's mapping we introduce the logical connectives of $\mathcal{IPL}^{\mathcal{STT}}$ as abbreviations for the following λ -terms (we omit the types here):

$$\begin{aligned} \dot{\rightarrow} &= \lambda \phi. \lambda W. \neg \forall V. \neg r W V \vee \phi V \\ \dot{\supset} &= \lambda \phi. \lambda \psi. \lambda W. \neg (\forall V. \neg r W V \vee \phi V) \vee (\forall V. \neg r W V \vee \psi V) \\ \dot{\vee} &= \lambda \phi. \lambda \psi. \lambda W. (\forall V. \neg r W V \vee \phi V) \vee (\forall V. \neg r W V \vee \psi V) \\ \dot{\wedge} &= \lambda \phi. \lambda \psi. \lambda W. \neg (\neg \phi W \vee \neg \psi W) \end{aligned}$$

3. We define the set of $\mathcal{IPL}^{\mathcal{STT}}$ -propositions as the smallest set of simply typed λ -terms for which the following hold:
 - $p_{\mu \rightarrow o}^1, \dots, p_{\mu \rightarrow o}^m$ define the atomic $\mathcal{IPL}^{\mathcal{STT}}$ -propositions.

³ Alternative mappings have been proposed and studied in the literature which we could employ here equally as well.

- If ϕ and ψ are \mathcal{IPL}^{STT} -propositions, then so are $\neg \phi$, $\phi \dot{\supset} \psi$, $\phi \dot{\vee} \psi$, and $\phi \dot{\wedge} \psi$.

The notion of validity we adopt is the same as for \mathcal{QML}^{STT} . However, since Gödel connects \mathcal{IPL} with modal logic $S4$, we transform each proof problem $t \in \mathcal{IPL}$ into a corresponding proof problem t' in STT of the following form

$$t' := ((\text{valid } \forall \phi_{\mu \rightarrow o} \Box_r \phi \supset \phi) \wedge (\text{valid } \forall \phi_{\mu \rightarrow o} \Box_r \phi \supset \Box_r \Box_r \phi)) \Rightarrow (\text{valid } t_{\mu \rightarrow o})$$

where $t_{\mu \rightarrow o}$ is the \mathcal{IPL}^{STT} term for t according to our definition above. Alternatively we may translate t into $t'' := ((\text{reflexive } r) \wedge (\text{transitive } r)) \Rightarrow (\text{valid } t_{\mu \rightarrow o})$.

Combining soundness [23] and completeness [28] of Gödel's embedding with Theorem 1 we obtain the following soundness and completeness result: Let $t \in \mathcal{IPL}$ and let $t' \in STT$ as constructed above. t is valid in propositional intuitionistic logic if and only if t' is valid in STT .

Example problems in intuitionistic logic have been encoded in THF syntax [15] and added to the TPTP THF library⁴ and are accessible under identifiers SYO058'4 – SYO074'4.

Access Control Logics Garg and Abadi recently translated several prominent access control logics into modal logic $S4$ and proved these translations sound and complete [21]. We have combined this work with our above results in order to obtain a sound and complete embedding of these access control logics in STT and we have carried out experiments with the prover LEO-II [7]. Example problems have been added to the TPTP THF library and are accessible under identifiers SWV425'x – SWV436'x (for $x \in \{1, \dots, 4\}$).

Logics for Spatial Reasoning Evidently, the region connection calculus [30] is a fragment of STT : choose a base type r ('region') and a reflexive and symmetric relation c ('connected') of type $r \rightarrow r \rightarrow o$ and define (where X, Y , and Z are variables of type r):

$$\begin{aligned} \text{disconnected} : dc &= \lambda X, Y. \neg(c X Y) \\ \text{part of} : p &= \lambda X, Y. \forall Z. ((c Z X) \Rightarrow (c Z Y)) \\ \text{identical with} : eq &= \lambda X, Y. ((p X Y) \wedge (p Y X)) \\ \text{overlaps} : o &= \lambda X, Y. \exists Z. ((p Z X) \wedge (p Z Y)) \\ \text{partially overlaps} : po &= \lambda X, Y. ((o X Y) \wedge \neg(p X Y) \wedge \neg(p Y X)) \\ \text{externally connected} : ec &= \lambda X, Y. ((c X Y) \wedge \neg(o X Y)) \\ \text{proper part} : pp &= \lambda X, Y. ((p X Y) \wedge \neg(p Y X)) \\ \text{tangential proper part} : tpp &= \lambda X, Y. ((pp X Y) \wedge \exists Z. ((ec Z X) \wedge (ec Z Y))) \\ \text{nontang. proper part} : ntp &= \lambda X, Y. ((pp X Y) \wedge \neg \exists Z. ((ec Z X) \wedge (ec Z Y))) \end{aligned}$$

An example problem for the region connection calculus will be discussed below.

⁴ TPTP THF problems for various problem categories are available at <http://www.cs.miami.edu/~tptp/cgi-bin/SeeTPTP?Category=Problems>; all problem identifiers with an "'" in their name refer to higher-order THF problems. The TPTP library meanwhile contains more than 2700 example problems in THF syntax.

4 Reasoning about Logics and Combinations of Logics

We illustrate how our approach supports reasoning about logics and their combinations. First, we focus on modal logics and their well known relationships between properties of accessibility relations and corresponding modal axioms (respectively axiom schemata) [25]. Such meta-theoretic insights can be elegantly encoded (and, as we will later see, automatically proved) in our approach. First we encode various accessibility relation properties in STT :

$$\text{reflexive} = \lambda R. \forall S. R S S \quad (1)$$

$$\text{symmetric} = \lambda R. \forall S, T. ((R S T) \Rightarrow (R T S)) \quad (2)$$

$$\text{serial} = \lambda R. \forall S. \exists T. (R S T) \quad (3)$$

$$\text{transitive} = \lambda R. \forall S, T, U. ((R S T) \wedge (R T U) \Rightarrow (R S U)) \quad (4)$$

$$\text{euclidean} = \lambda R. \forall S, T, U. ((R S T) \wedge (R S U) \Rightarrow (R T U)) \quad (5)$$

$$\text{partially_functional} = \lambda R. \forall S, T, U. ((R S T) \wedge (R S U) \Rightarrow T = U) \quad (6)$$

$$\text{functional} = \lambda R. \forall S. \exists T. ((R S T) \wedge \forall U. ((R S U) \Rightarrow T = U)) \quad (7)$$

$$\text{weakly_dense} = \lambda R. \forall S, T. ((R S T) \Rightarrow \exists U. ((R S U) \wedge (R U T))) \quad (8)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{weakly_connected} = \lambda R. \forall S, T, U. (((R S T) \wedge (R S U)) \Rightarrow \\ ((R T U) \vee T = U \vee (R U T))) \end{aligned} \quad (9)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{weakly_directed} = \lambda R. \forall S, T, U. (((R S T) \wedge (R S U)) \Rightarrow \\ \exists V. ((R T V) \wedge (R U V))) \end{aligned} \quad (10)$$

Remember, that R is of type $\mu \rightarrow \mu \rightarrow o$ and S, T, U are of type μ . The corresponding axioms are given next.

$$\begin{array}{ll} M : \forall \phi. \Box_r \phi \supset \phi & (11) & \forall \phi. \Diamond_r \phi \supset \Box_r \phi & (16) \\ B : \forall \phi. \phi \supset \Box_r \Diamond_r \phi & (12) & \forall \phi. \Diamond_r \phi \Leftrightarrow \Box_r \phi & (17) \\ D : \forall \phi. \Box_r \phi \supset \Diamond_r \phi & (13) & \forall \phi. \Box_r \Box_r \phi \supset \Box_r \phi & (18) \\ 4 : \forall \phi. \Box_r \phi \supset \Box_r \Box_r \phi & (14) & \forall \phi, \psi. \Box_r ((\phi \wedge \Box_r \phi) \supset \psi) \vee \\ & & \Box_r ((\psi \wedge \Box_r \psi) \supset \phi) & (19) \\ 5 : \forall \phi. \Diamond_r \phi \supset \Box_r \Diamond_r \phi & (15) & \forall \phi. \Diamond_r \Box_r \phi \supset \Box_r \Diamond_r \phi & (20) \end{array}$$

Example 1. For k ($k = (1), \dots, (10)$) we can now easily formulate the well known correspondence theorems $(k) \Rightarrow (k + 10)$ and $(k) \Leftarrow (k + 10)$. For example,

$$(1) \Rightarrow (11) : \forall R. (\text{reflexive } R) \Rightarrow (\text{valid } \forall \phi. \Box_R \phi \supset \phi)$$

Example 2. There are well known relationships between different modal logics and there exist alternatives for their axiomatization (cf. the relationship map in [22]). For example, for modal logic S5 we may choose axioms M and 5 as standard axioms. Respectively for logic KB5 we may choose B and 5. We may then want to investigate the following conjectures (the only one that does not hold is (31)):

$$\begin{aligned}
S5 = M5 &\Leftrightarrow MB5 & (21) \\
&\Leftrightarrow M4B5 & (22) \\
&\Leftrightarrow M45 & (23) \\
&\Leftrightarrow M4B & (24) \\
&\Leftrightarrow D4B & (25) \\
&\Leftrightarrow D4B5 & (26) \\
&\Leftrightarrow DB5 & (27) \\
KB5 &\Leftrightarrow K4B5 & (28) \\
&\Leftrightarrow K4B & (29) \\
M5 &\Rightarrow D45 & (30) \\
D45 &\Rightarrow M5 & (31)
\end{aligned}$$

Exploiting the correlations $(k) \Leftrightarrow (k + 10)$ from before these problems can be formulated as follows; we give the case for $M5 \Leftrightarrow D4B$:

$$\forall R_{\bullet}(((\text{reflexive } R) \wedge (\text{euclidean } R)) \Leftrightarrow ((\text{serial } R) \wedge (\text{transitive } R) \wedge (\text{symmetric } R)))$$

Example 3. We can also encode the Barcan formula and its converse. (They are theorems in our approach, which confirms that we are 'constant domain'.)

$$BF : \text{ valid } \forall X_{\iota} \cdot \Box_r (p_{\iota \rightarrow (\mu \rightarrow o)} X) \supset \Box_r \forall X_{\iota} \cdot (p_{\iota \rightarrow (\mu \rightarrow o)} X) \quad (32)$$

$$BF^{-1} : \text{ valid } \Box_r \forall X_{\iota} \cdot (p_{\iota \rightarrow (\mu \rightarrow o)} X) \supset \forall X_{\iota} \cdot \Box_r (p_{\iota \rightarrow (\mu \rightarrow o)} X) \quad (33)$$

Example 4. An interesting meta property for combined logics with modalities $\Diamond_i, \Box_j, \Box_k$, and \Diamond_l is the correspondence between the following axiom and the (i, j, k, l) -confluence property

$$\begin{aligned}
&(\text{valid } \forall \phi_{\bullet} (\Diamond_i \Box_j \phi) \supset \Box_k \Diamond_l \phi) \\
&\Leftrightarrow (\forall A_{\bullet} \forall B_{\bullet} \forall C_{\bullet} (((i A B) \wedge (k A C)) \Rightarrow \exists D_{\bullet} ((j B D) \wedge (l C D)))) \quad (34)
\end{aligned}$$

Example 5. Segerberg [31] discusses a 2-dimensional logic providing two S5 modalities \Box_a and \Box_b . He adds further axioms stating that these modalities are commutative and orthogonal. It actually turns out that orthogonality is already implied in this context. This statement can be encoded in our framework as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
&(\text{reflexive } a), (\text{transitive } a), (\text{euclid. } a), (\text{reflexive } b), (\text{transitive } b), (\text{euclid. } b), \\
&(\text{valid } \forall \phi_{\bullet} \Box_a \Box_b \phi \Leftrightarrow \Box_b \Box_a \phi) \\
&\models^{STT} (\text{valid } \forall \phi, \psi_{\bullet} \Box_a (\Box_a \phi \vee \Box_b \psi) \supset (\Box_a \phi \vee \Box_a \psi)) \wedge \\
&\quad (\text{valid } \forall \phi, \psi_{\bullet} \Box_b (\Box_a \phi \vee \Box_b \psi) \supset (\Box_b \phi \vee \Box_b \psi)) \quad (35)
\end{aligned}$$

Example 6. Suppose we want to work with a 2-dimensional logic combining a modality \Box_k of knowledge with a modality \Box_b of belief. Moreover, suppose we model \Box_k as an S5 modality and \Box_b as an D45 modality and let us furthermore add two axioms characterizing their relationship. We may then want to check whether or not \Box_k and \Box_b coincide, i.e., whether \Box_k includes \Box_b :

$$\begin{aligned}
&(\text{reflexive } k), (\text{transitive } k), (\text{euclid. } k), (\text{serial } b), (\text{transitive } b), (\text{euclid. } b), \\
&(\text{valid } \forall \phi_{\bullet} \Box_k \phi \supset \Box_b \phi), (\text{valid } \forall \phi_{\bullet} \Box_b \phi \supset \Box_b \Box_k \phi) \\
&\models^{STT} (\text{valid } \forall \phi_{\bullet} \Box_b \phi \supset \Box_k \phi) \quad (36)
\end{aligned}$$

5 Reasoning within Combined Logics

We illustrate how our approach supports reasoning within combined logics. First we present two examples in epistemic reasoning. In this examples we model the individual and common knowledge of different persons respectively agents by combining different modalities. Our formulation in both cases adapts Baldoni's modeling [6].

Example 7 (Epistemic reasoning: The friends puzzle). (i) Peter is a friend of John, so if Peter knows that John knows something then John knows that Peter knows the same thing. (ii) Peter is married, so if Peter's wife knows something, then Peter knows the same thing. John and Peter have an appointment, let us consider the following situation: (a) Peter knows the time of their appointment. (b) Peter also knows that John knows the place of their appointment. Moreover, (c) Peter's wife knows that if Peter knows the time of their appointment, then John knows that too (since John and Peter are friends). Finally, (d) Peter knows that if John knows the place and the time of their appointment, then John knows that he has an appointment. From this situation we want to prove (e) that each of the two friends knows that the other one knows that he has an appointment.

For modeling the knowledge of Peter, Peter's wife, and John we consider a 3-dimensional logic combining the modalities \Box_p , $\Box_{(w p)}$, and \Box_j . Actually modeling them as S4 modalities turns out to be sufficient for this example. Hence, we introduce three corresponding accessibility relations j , p , and $(w p)$. The S4 axioms for $x \in \{j, p, (w p)\}$ are

$$\text{valid } \forall \phi. \Box_x \phi \supset \phi \quad (37)$$

$$\text{valid } \forall \phi. \Box_x \phi \supset \Box_x \Box_x \phi \quad (38)$$

As done before, we could alternatively postulate that the accessibility relations are reflexive and transitive.

Next, we encode the facts from the puzzle. For (i) we provide a persistence axiom and for (ii) an inclusion axiom:

$$\text{valid } \forall \phi. \Box_p \Box_j \phi \supset \Box_j \Box_p \phi \quad (39)$$

$$\text{valid } \forall \phi. \Box_{(w p)} \phi \supset \Box_p \phi \quad (40)$$

Finally, the facts (a)-(d) and the conclusion (e) are encoded as follows (time, place, and appointment are propositional constants, that is, constants of type $\mu \rightarrow o$ in our framework):

$$\text{valid } \Box_p \text{ time} \quad (41)$$

$$\text{valid } \Box_p \Box_j \text{ place} \quad (42)$$

$$\text{valid } \Box_{(w p)} (\Box_p \text{ time} \supset \Box_j \text{ time}) \quad (43)$$

$$\text{valid } \Box_p \Box_j (\text{place} \wedge \text{time} \supset \text{appointment}) \quad (44)$$

$$\text{valid } \Box_j \Box_p \text{ appointment} \wedge \Box_p \Box_j \text{ appointment} \quad (45)$$

The combined proof problem for Example 8 is

$$(37), \dots, (44) \models^{STIT} (45) \quad (46)$$

Example 8 (Wise men puzzle). Once upon a time, a king wanted to find the wisest out of his three wisest men. He arranged them in a circle and told them that he would put a white or a black spot on their foreheads and that one of the three spots would certainly be white. The three wise men could see and hear each other but, of course, they could not see their faces reflected anywhere. The king, then, asked to each of them to find out the color of his own spot. After a while, the wisest correctly answered that his spot was white.

We employ a 4-dimensional logic combining the modalities \Box_a , \Box_b , and \Box_c , for encoding the individual knowledge of the three wise men, and a box operator \Box_{fool} , for encoding the knowledge that is common to all of them. The entire encoding consists now of the following axioms for $X, Y, Z \in \{a, b, c\}$ and $X \neq Y \neq Z$:

$$\text{valid } \Box_{\text{fool}} ((\text{ws } a) \vee (\text{ws } b) \vee (\text{ws } c)) \quad (47)$$

$$\text{valid } \Box_{\text{fool}} ((\text{ws } X) \supset \Box_Y (\text{ws } X)) \quad (48)$$

$$\text{valid } \Box_{\text{fool}} (\neg(\text{ws } X) \supset \Box_Y \neg(\text{ws } X)) \quad (49)$$

$$\text{valid } \forall \phi. \Box_{\text{fool}} \phi \supset \phi \quad (50)$$

$$\text{valid } \forall \phi. \Box_{\text{fool}} \phi \supset \Box_{\text{fool}} \Box_{\text{fool}} \phi \quad (51)$$

$$\text{valid } \forall \phi. \Box_{\text{fool}} \phi \supset \Box_a \phi \quad (52)$$

$$\text{valid } \forall \phi. \Box_{\text{fool}} \phi \supset \Box_b \phi \quad (53)$$

$$\text{valid } \forall \phi. \Box_{\text{fool}} \phi \supset \Box_c \phi \quad (54)$$

$$\text{valid } \forall \phi. \neg \Box_X \phi \supset \Box_Y \neg \Box_X \phi \quad (55)$$

$$\text{valid } \forall \phi. \Box_X \phi \supset \Box_Y \Box_X \phi \quad (56)$$

$$\text{valid } \neg \Box_a (\text{ws } a) \quad (57)$$

$$\text{valid } \neg \Box_b (\text{ws } b) \quad (58)$$

From these assumptions we want to conclude that

$$\text{valid } \Box_c (\text{ws } c) \quad (59)$$

Axiom (47) says that a, b, or c must have a white spot and that this information is known to everybody. Axioms (48) and (49) express that it is generally known that if someone has a white spot (or not) then the others see and hence know this. \Box_{fool} is axiomatized as an S4 modality in axioms (50) and (51). For \Box_a , \Box_b , and \Box_c it is sufficient to consider K modalities. The relation between those and common knowledge (\Box_{fool} modality) is axiomatized in inclusion axioms (52)–(55). Axioms (55) and (56) encode that whenever a wise man does (not) know something the others know that he does (not) know this. Axioms (57)

and (58) say that a and b do not know whether they have a white spot. Finally, conjecture (59) states that that c knows he has a white spot. The combined proof problem for Example 7 is

$$(47), \dots, (58) \models^{STT} (59) \quad (60)$$

Example 9. A trivial example problem for the region connection calculus is (adapted from [20], p. 80):

$$\begin{aligned} & (tpc catalunya spain), \\ & (ec spain france), \\ & (ntpc paris france), \\ & \models^{STT} (dc catalunya paris) \wedge (dc spain paris) \end{aligned} \quad (61)$$

The assumptions express that (i) Catalunya is a border region of Spain, (ii) Spain and France are two different countries sharing a common border, and (iii) Paris is a proper part of France. The conjecture is that (iv) Catalunya and Paris are disconnected as well as Spain and Paris.

Example 10. Within our STT framework we can easily put such spatial reasoning examples in an epistemic context, that is, we can model the individual spatial knowledge of different agents. Similar to before we here distinguish between common knowledge (fool) and the knowledge of person bob:

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{valid } \forall \phi. \Box_{\text{fool}} \phi \supset \Box_{\text{bob}} \phi, \\ & \text{valid } \Box_{\text{bob}} (\lambda W. (tpc catalunya spain)), \\ & \text{valid } \Box_{\text{fool}} (\lambda W. (ec spain france)), \\ & \text{valid } \Box_{\text{bob}} (\lambda W. (ntpc paris france)) \\ & \models^{STT} \\ & \text{valid } \Box_{\text{bob}} (\lambda W. ((dc catalunya paris) \wedge (dc spain paris))) \end{aligned} \quad (62)$$

We here express that (ii) from above is commonly known, while (i) and (iii) are not. (i) and (iii) are known to the educated person bob though. In this situation, conjecture (iv) still follows for bob. However, it does not follow when replacing bob by common knowledge (hence, the following problem is not provable):

$$\dots \models^{STT} \text{valid } \Box_{\text{fool}} (\lambda W. ((dc catalunya paris) \wedge (dc spain paris))) \quad (63)$$

In order to facilitate the combination of logics we have here lifted the region connection calculus propositions of type o to modal propositions of type $\mu \rightarrow o$ by λ -abstraction. Thus, the region connection calculus statements can now be applied to possible worlds; they evaluate statically though for all possible worlds since the λ -abstracted variable W is fresh for the encapsulated region connection calculus proposition.

$$\underbrace{(tpc catalunya spain)}_{\text{type } o} \longrightarrow \underbrace{(\lambda W. (tpc catalunya spain))}_{\text{type } \iota \rightarrow o}$$

6 Experiments

In our case studies, we have employed the *STT* automated reasoners LEO-II—v1.1 [12], TPS—3.080227G1d [4], IsabelleP—2009-1, IsabelleM—2009-1, and IsabelleN—2009-1.⁵ These systems are available online via the SystemOnTPTP tool [32] and they support the new TPTP THF infrastructure for typed higher-order logic [15]. Their reasoning power is currently improving rapidly.

The axiomatizations of \mathcal{QML}^{STT} and \mathcal{IPL}^{STT} are available as LCL013^0.ax and LCL010^0.ax in the TPTP library.⁶ The example problems LCL698^1.p and LCL695^1.p ask about the satisfiability of these axiomatizations. Both questions are answered positively by the Satallax prover [5] in less than a second.

Table 1 presents the results of our experiments; the timeout was set to 120 seconds and the entries in the table are reported in seconds. Those examples which have already entered the new higher-order TPTP library are presented with their respective TPTP identifiers in the second column and the others have meanwhile been submitted and will appear in a forthcoming TPTP release.

As expected, (31) and (63) cannot be proved by any prover and IsabelleN reports a counterexample for (31) in 34.4 seconds and for (63) in 39.7 seconds.

In summary, all but one of our example problems can be solved effectively by at least one of the reasoners. In fact, most of our example problems require only milliseconds. LEO-II solves most problems and it is the fastest prover in our experiment.

As mentioned before, we are not aware of any other running system that can handle all of the above problems.

7 Conclusion

Our overall goal is to show that various interesting classical and non-classical logics and their combinations can be elegantly mechanized and partly automated in modern higher-order reasoning systems with the help of our logic embeddings.

Our experiments are encouraging and they provide first evidence for our claim that *STT* is suited as a framework for combining classical and non-classical logics. It is obvious, however, that *STT* reasoners should be significantly improved for fruitful application to more challenge problems in practice. The author is convinced that significant improvements — in particular for fragments of *STT* as illustrated in this paper — are possible and that they will be fostered by the new TPTP infrastructure and the new yearly higher-order CASC competitions.

Note that when working with our reasoners from within a proof assistant such as Isabelle/HOL the user may also provide interactive help if the reasoning

⁵ IsabelleM and IsabelleN are model finder in the Isabelle proof assistant [29] that have been made available in batch mode, while IsabelleP applies a series of Isabelle proof tactics in batch mode.

⁶ Note that the types μ and ι are unfortunately switched in the encodings available in the TPTP: the former is used for individuals and the latter for worlds. This syntactic switch is completely unproblematic.

Problem	TPTP id	LEO-II	TPS	IsabelleP
Reasoning about Logics and Combined Logics				
(1) \Rightarrow (11)	LCL699 ^{1.p}	0.0	0.3	3.6
(2) \Rightarrow (12)	LCL700 ^{1.p}	0.0	0.3	13.9
(3) \Rightarrow (13)	LCL701 ^{1.p}	0.0	0.3	4.0
(4) \Rightarrow (14)	LCL702 ^{1.p}	0.0	0.3	15.9
(5) \Rightarrow (15)	LCL703 ^{1.p}	0.1	0.3	16.0
(6) \Rightarrow (16)	LCL704 ^{1.p}	0.0	0.3	3.6
(7) \Rightarrow (17)	LCL705 ^{1.p}	0.1	51.2	3.9
(8) \Rightarrow (18)	LCL706 ^{1.p}	0.1	0.3	3.9
(9) \Rightarrow (19)	LCL707 ^{1.p}	0.1	0.3	3.6
(10) \Rightarrow (20)	LCL708 ^{1.p}	0.1	0.3	4.1
(1) \Leftarrow (11)	LCL709 ^{1.p}	0.0	0.3	3.7
(2) \Leftarrow (12)	LCL710 ^{1.p}	—	0.3	53.8
(3) \Leftarrow (13)	LCL711 ^{1.p}	0.0	0.3	3.7
(4) \Leftarrow (14)	LCL712 ^{1.p}	0.0	0.3	3.8
(5) \Leftarrow (15)	LCL713 ^{1.p}	—	0.8	67.0
(6) \Leftarrow (16)	LCL714 ^{1.p}	1.6	0.3	29.3
(7) \Leftarrow (17)	LCL715 ^{1.p}	37.9	—	—
(8) \Leftarrow (18)	LCL716 ^{1.p}	—	6.6	—
(9) \Leftarrow (19)	LCL717 ^{1.p}	—	—	—
(10) \Leftarrow (20)	LCL718 ^{1.p}	0.1	0.4	8.1
(21)		0.1	0.4	4.3
(22)		0.2	27.4	4.0
(23)		0.1	8.9	4.0
(24)		0.1	1.2	3.7
(25)		0.1	1.7	4.2
(26)		0.2	14.8	5.4
(27)		0.1	0.6	3.7
(28)		0.2	2.3	4.0
(29)		0.1	0.9	3.9
(30)		0.1	12.8	16.5
(31) Countersatisfiable		—	—	—
(32)		0.0	0.3	3.6
(33)		0.0	0.3	3.6
(34)		0.1	0.4	3.6
(35)		0.2	35.5	—
(36)		0.4	—	—
Reasoning within Combined Logics				
(46)	PUZ086 ^{1.p}	0.1	—	102.4
(60)	PUZ087 ^{1.p}	0.3	—	—
(61)		2.3	—	112.7
(62)		20.4	—	—
(63) Countersatisfiable		—	—	—

Table 1. Performance results of *STT* provers for problems in paper.

tasks are still to challenging, for example, by formulating some lemmas or by splitting proof tasks in simpler subtasks.

An advantage of our approach also is that provers such as our LEO-II are generally capable of producing verifiable proof output, though much further work is needed to make these proof protocols exchangeable between systems or to explain them to humans. Furthermore, it may be possible to formally verify the entire theory of our embedding(s) within a proof assistant.

The work presented in this paper has its roots in the LEO-II project (in 2006/2007 at University of Cambridge, UK) in which we first studied and employed the presented embedding of quantified and propositional multimodal logics in STT [9, 11]. This research, amongst others, is currently continued in the DFG project ONTOLEO (BE 2501/6-1). In ONTOLEO we study whether our approach can be applied to automate modalities in ontology reasoning [14, 13]. However, our work is relevant also for other application directions, including multi-agent systems. Studying the scalability of our approach for a range of applications is thus important future work.

Acknowledgment: The author is indebted to Larry Paulson, Geoff Sutcliffe, and Chad Brown. Larry Paulson, together with the author, initiated the LEO-II project at Cambridge University (EPSRC grant LEO-II EP/D070511/1). Geoff Sutcliffe, in collaboration with the author and supported by several further contributors, developed the new higher-order TPTP THF infrastructure (EU FP7 grant THFTPTP PIF-GA-2008-219982). Both projects had a significant impact on the work presented in this article. Moreover, Chad Brown originally inspired this research with a presentation at Loria, Nancy in 2005.

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